Do Economic Policies Draw More Voters to Ballot Boxes? 

The 2025 vote represents a critical opportunity for Iraq’s political actors to restore voter trust.

Elections through an Economic Lens

Generally, on public policy matters, adopting a specific policy course of action is not one of the strengths of Iraqi political parties and coalitions during and after election campaigns. Repetitive promises of reform populate political campaign platforms that vie for voter influence and popular support. Historically, the chronic lack of clear policies in the overall agenda of political parties on issues that directly concern voters, such as the economy, has translated into voter disengagement in the electoral process. Economic and financial matters lie at the heart of voters’ concerns throughout Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region. Often, people’s economic and financial struggles for their wallets reach the ballot boxes; voters use their voting rights as a check on the ruling parties, where election promises consistently fail to deliver tangible relief. Over the past two decades, persisting governance and service-delivery challenges incited anger and mistrust in the electoral process, pushing voters to either abstain during elections or support political parties that prioritize everyday financial pressures, even on vague reform promises. In a way, electoral choices focus on evaluating which policy options most directly improve voters’ economic well-being, thereby leading them to vote for parties that prioritize Iraqi household finances, jobs, and affordable essentials and services.  

Iraq’s parliamentary elections in November 2025 represent a continuation of the country’s decades-long financial and economic troubles as a result of internal conflict and misgovernment, among other factors. Absentee or voted ballots may indicate an economic voting behavior testing whether the contesting parties can deliver tangible reforms and translate economic policy commitments into real improvements for the Iraqi electorates. On this basis, voter turnout and level of public trust seem to directly correlate with structural economic and financial issues that continue to weigh heavily on the Iraqi public. And certainly, public opinion views of the economy,¹ although impacted by several multidimensional factors,² change following significant political shifts, especially during and after elections.

Often, people’s economic and financial struggles for their wallets reach the ballot boxes; voters use their voting rights as a check on the ruling parties, where election promises consistently fail to deliver tangible relief.

There are several factors at play that contribute to Iraq’s economic vulnerability, including heavy reliance on oil revenues, an ever-expanding public sector employing 4.5 millions of Iraqis,³ fiscal instability, underinvestment in public infrastructure, and high unemployment, especially among the youth, reaching 16.5% in 2025.⁴ Since the fall of the Baath regime in 2003, Iraq’s economic and financial sectors have undergone prolonged periods of severe instability. Most notably, the political instability following the withdrawal of US forces significantly destabilized Iraq’s fragile and young democracy. It also paved the way for extremist groups, such as ISIL (also called ISIS) to push their destabilizing impact on Iraq, further eroding the social fabric and severely undermining Iraq’s political, economic, and financial stability. The financial fallout of combating ISIL until its territorial defeat in December 2017 was further exacerbated with the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent global recession, particularly as oil prices dropped to a historic average low of $32 per barrel globally in 2020.⁵ Again, Iraq took a severe financial hit, pushing millions of Iraqis into poverty⁶ as most of Iraq’s revenues depend on oil accounting for 85% of the government’s budget and 42% of gross domestic product (GDP).⁷  

Iraq’s fragile democracy since its birth in 2003 has been part of the surmounting economic and financial troubles, giving rise to a potent patronage system, clientelism, and institutional weaknesses that effectively abort efforts towards meaningful structural reforms. Given this background, Iraq’s economic and financial troubles remain a key challenge and yet an opportunity for political actors who understand economic pressures may become a deciding factor in shaping the electoral process and voter behavior. Yet, arriving at an economically and financially stable Iraq has been a significant challenge for Iraq’s political actors and ruling parties. However, during elections, the contesting parties and coalitions, including independent candidates, particularly emphasize economic plans and reforms at the forefront of their agenda. The question, therefore, is whether the November elections represent opportunities for the contesting parties to gain voter trust through communicating well-structured economic plans and reforms that directly address voters’ demands for a better quality of life.  

The following sections will shed light on the intersection of electoral dynamics with economic realities. The two exclusive interviews conducted for this paper aim to evaluate the contesting parties’ economic and financial reform promises, or lack thereof, and their impact on electoral success. The paper also highlights the challenges ahead of Iraq’s bumpy road towards a unified economic vision and financial stability. Additionally, how political actors attempt to address these issues through encouraging political participation is critically important to support Iraq’s transition toward a new era for economic growth and development.  

The Case for Economic Voting and Public Confidence  

When economic pressures compound, voters' behavior frequently shifts towards “economic voting.”¹⁵ The two types of economic voting consist of Sociotropic voting and pocketbook voting. In the former case, voters consider the overall health of the national economy, while in the latter case, voters focus on their personal financial situation.¹⁶ Economic voting thus impacts voter turnout, political engagement, and public confidence in the electoral process. Although there is no hard evidence to support whether either type of economic voting is prevalent among the Iraqi electorate, past performance provides a glimpse into how voters tend to reward incumbents when the economy is doing well and punish them when it is doing poorly. In either case, the ruling and contesting parties need to understand that failure to communicate inclusive economic and financial policy plans serves as a key signal for voters to boycott political actors who do not prioritize their economic sufferings, especially among the youth who are of working age and account for 60.96 % of the Iraqi population.¹⁷  

Iraqis perceive unemployment, economic hardship, and corruption as the country’s most pressing problems in 2025.

Gallup International Member IIACSS Group in Iraq

As for public confidence in government institutions, shown in Graph 3, Iraq’s public mood remains a complex reflection of hardship, resilience, and cautious hope, according to a recent survey conducted by Gallup International Member IIACSS Group in Iraq. The survey titled “Shifts in Iraq’s Public Opinion from 2003 to 2025” showcases how Iraq’s public opinion has changed over the last two decades and indicates a 55 % confidence rate among Iraqis in the current government.¹⁸ The survey also highlights the sharp contrast in public opinion regarding the most serious problem facing Iraq over the course of the two decades (2003-2025). Iraqis perceive unemployment, economic hardship, and corruption as the country’s most pressing problems in 2025 while physical safety and security were emphasized as dominant concerns in 2003. Showcased in Graph 1 and Graph 2, the survey encapsulates this broader shift in national sentiment from ”fear of violence to frustration over livelihood, a crucial insight for understanding Iraq’s future policy priorities and the expectations of its citizens today, compared to 22 years ago.“

Growth and Stability as Iraq’s Next Frontiers 

For decades, security and stability issues have been under the spotlight for Iraq’s consecutive governments and international partners. The security imperative meant that other policy issues, such as good governance and particularly economic and financial reforms, were secondary priorities. The existing lack of policy attention towards effective economic and financial management, coupled with weak democratic institutions, retrospectively consistently impairs consecutive governments’ capacity to formulate meaningful policies that target tangible areas of the economy. For Iraq’s democratic experience, the link between economic performance and electoral success cannot be proven historically, but signs of voter trust erosion are easily detected. Iraq’s first election voter turnout reached a high of 79.63 % in the 2005 parliamentary elections and ever since has drastically dropped to 60.67% in 2010, 60.53% in 2014, 44.50% in 2018, and 41% in 2021.¹⁹  

Concerns over the economy²⁰ qualify as one of the key factors that play decisive roles in determining voter behavior and turnout. Sometimes, economic pressures and financial instability have led to mass demonstrations across Iraqi provinces, such as the Tishreen movement in Baghdad and multiple demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah. In addressing the surmounting economic and financial issues, the Iraqi government takes passive measures in response to public demands. Or it employs policies that backfire and cripple the government’s economic and financial power, such as utilizing the deeply entrenched patronage system that offers employment opportunities in the public sector in exchange for loyalties. This is a non-starter strategy to address an overinflated public sector that takes up the largest portion of state revenues and government expenditure.

Mr. Semtner highlighted the importance of creating a business environment supportive of financing and investment, especially for EU companies to invest in Iraq’s infrastructure.

European Union Ambassador to Iraq

Addressing such incremental issues in Iraq’s economic and financial sectors requires incorporating local, regional, and international outlooks that aim at connecting Iraq to the Middle East’s ever-expanding geopolitical infrastructure and shared stakes in stability. More importantly, as the IMF country report showcases, the decline in oil prices in 2025 makes the policy response to major economic and financial issues even more urgent. International and regional actors involved in Iraq are particularly focused on helping the Iraqi government resolve key issues in the economic and financial sectors. The IMF indicates Iraq’s projected economic growth rate will rise to 3.6% compared to the MENA average growth dropping sharply from 4% to just 0.3%.²¹ still, it warns Iraq and other non-Gulf oil-exporting countries of facing mounting economic pressure due to declining oil production and shrinking public spending.²² The UN also issued a warning to Iraq this early October regarding the risks of continuing to depend heavily on oil revenues to pay government salaries and called on the Iraqi government to diversify and invest in agriculture, renewable energy, and technology, describing these sectors as “fundamental pillars for economic diversification.”²³ 

Alicia Rico emphasized the importance of placing Iraq’s outlook in the geopolitical scenery and increasing multipolar competition in the broader Middle East and North Africa region.

Spanish Ambassador to Iraq

The new European Union Ambassador to Iraq, Klemens Semtner, during his panel in the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) forum, stressed the EU’s efforts towards curbing migration flows to Europe due to Iraq’s worsening economic situation. Mr. Semtner highlighted the importance of creating a business environment supportive of financing and investment, especially for EU companies to invest in Iraq’s infrastructure.²⁴ During the same panel, the Spanish Ambassador, Alicia Rico emphasized the importance of placing Iraq’s outlook in the geopolitical scenery and increasing multipolar competition in the broader Middle East and North Africa region.  

Ms. Alicia highlighted Spain’s major contribution in the security sector in Iraq in the larger context of EU mission and also having the biggest contingent in NATO mission in Iraq (NMI). However, she stressed the need for strengthening economic and commercial partnership as incremental next steps for Spain and the EU to support a transitioning Iraq toward stability, a thriving public sector, and a predictable investment climate. Overall, economic growth and stability take centerstage in Iraq’s growing partnerships, especially with the US,²⁵ and the shift towards regional and global connectivity, such as through the Development Road Project,²⁶ all provide opportunities to confront lingering economic and financial challenges and steer Iraq towards its economic renaissance.  

Major Alliances and Parties Contesting in the November Vote 

Key Sunni Alliances 

• Sovereignty (al-Siyada): led by Khamis al-Khanjar; influence in Al-Anbar and Saladin 
• Taqaddum (Progress): led by Mohammed al-Halbousi; urban strength in Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Saladin; governance/administration focus; open to post-election coalitions 
• Azm: led by Muthanna al-Samarrai; operates mainly in Saladin and parts of Nineveh 
• Al-Hasm al-Watani: led by Thabit Mohammed Saeed; five-party coalition, includes Hasm for Reform, al-Wafa, al-Hal 

Major Kurdish Parties 

• Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): led by Masoud Barzani; dominant in Erbil and Duhok; extends influence on disputed areas
• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): led by Bafel Talabani; strong in Al-Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, parts of Kirkuk 
• New Generation Movement (A-Jeel Al-Jadeed): led by Srwa Abdulwahid; reformist, youth appeal; presence mainly in Sulaymaniyah and some parts of Erbil and Duhok. 

Leading Shia-majority Alliances 

• Reconstruction and Development Coalition: led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani; focus on reconstruction and economic reform 
• State of Law Coalition: led by Nouri al-Maliki; 11 parties; central/southern bases
• National State Forces Alliance: led by Ammar al-Hakim; reform-oriented  
• Badr List: led by Hadi al-Amiri; strong in Diyala, Basra, Wasit; part of Coordination Framework 
• Al-Sadiqoun List: led by Qais al-Khazali with tribal outreach 
• Ibshir Ya Iraq Alliance: led by Hamam Hamoudi; includes seven groups 
• Iraqi al-Asas Coalition: led by Ali Mohsen Akbar al-Mandlawi; appeals to youth/independents 
• Tasmeem Alliance: led by Amer al-Fayez; focuses on national moderation and local governance
• Hoquq Movement: led by Hussein Moanis 

Other Alliances: 

• Al-Badil (The Alternative): led by Adnan al-Zurfi; 11 parties
• Ishraqat Kanoon: led by Haider Al-Mutairi 
• Democratic Civil Alliance: led by Kazem Ali al-Rifai 

Sources: IHEC,²⁷ Shafaq News²⁸ and Peregraf.²⁹ 

Key Economic Policy Debates of the Moment 

Economic and fiscal reforms, job creation, and services provisions are popular items in the contesting parties’ campaigns. Besides individual political parties running, coalition-building has become central to this election to appeal to a large base of voters, particularly as economic reform plans are bartered politically.³⁰ The November elections provide the opportunity for political parties and coalitions to frame their economic reform promises that aim to deliver a better quality of life. The challenge, however, lies in how voters can be enabled to decide what major policy issues are prioritized by contesting political parties and coalitions when the political culture of Iraqi elections fundamentally lacks a policy-driven election agenda. Additionally, the lack of voter awareness of policy priorities coupled with contesting parties’ short-term goals leaves little room for discussion on policy matters, especially when it comes to coherent economic visions. Given that Iraq's political structure is yet to mature democratically, it is unlikely that political parties and coalitions will emphasize their policy plans in a clear agenda in the near future. Nonetheless, the central issues discussed so far by the contesting political parties and coalitions include the following:³¹  

• Strengthening economic stability by reducing fiscal imbalances 
• Promoting economic diversification beyond oil  
• Creating job opportunities, especially targeting high youth unemployment 
• Improving delivery of public services provisions 
• Fighting corruption and improving internal governance, including rule of law and financial transparency 

Thinking Like an Economist 

Iraq's unique economic challenges require a political class that understands the need for long-term planning to translate political promises into clear and credible policies. Campaign promises that fail to present detailed, actionable plans to the electorate once elections conclude struggle to materialize, which is the case for most parties and coalitions that later form the government. This also means that the government-elect has one choice: to prioritize immediate spending over long-term economic and financial reform. To arrive at an economically and financially stable Iraq, political actors should set clear economic and financial policies in the lead-up to the November elections and prioritize issues that will likely shape voters’ behavior in the ballot boxes. The November elections represent opportunities for Iraq to enter into a new era where it is not shaped by security issues but prioritizes a ready-for-investment Iraq with a functioning economy, financial stability, and equitable development for all Iraqis in the decades to come.  

What Do Experts Think? The following interviews delve deeper into these policy themes, providing valuable insights into Iraq’s economic challenges, political structure and the country’s current electoral shape. They provide an outline for how economic realities intersect with political choices and voter behavior necessary to better understand the forces shaping Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections. 

On the General State of the Economy and Political System in Iraq

When we look at Iraq’s economy and political scene, it's clear that neither the electorate nor the politicians are genuinely focused on serious economic reforms. This isn’t just an Iraqi issue; it’s a global trend. In many countries, including here in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, real economic choices and reforms are often sidelined, especially when the economy seems stable on the surface. 

Iraq faces significant challenges, like the heavy burden the public sector places on the national budget. This is particularly worrying because Iraq is still a very young country with a growing workforce, and continued high spending on current public expenditures is unsustainable. Simply put, the country cannot keep hiring people into the public sector indefinitely—it will hurt Iraq’s long-term prospects. When I co-authored the white paper in 2020, we emphasized the critical need to rethink the “social contract.” It’s clear that the old model of continually expanding public sector employment isn’t viable anymore. 

Another core issue is Iraq’s overwhelming dependence on oil, a commodity over which the country has no pricing control. Although Iraq is a low-cost producer and likely to remain important in the market, long-term demand for oil is expected to decline. So, even if oil prices rise, it won’t solve Iraq’s deep fiscal challenges. 

The government continues to hire many, often unproductive, public-sector employees, and this isn’t unique to Iraq but common in many resource-rich countries. Hiring is used as a tool to buy loyalty, but this approach strains the budget. The pension system is also under pressure because pensions and salaries are paid directly from the budget, not from a sustainable fund. 

When it comes to Iraq's parliamentary elections, the economy tends not to drive policies or campaigns because the tough economic choices needed would be unpopular and politically risky. This short-termism extends well beyond Iraq—it's a global phenomenon. 

On subsidies, efforts like the Runaki electricity project in the KRI show progress, but public resistance remains strong because people don’t want to pay their bills. Politicians know that attempting such reforms, which may involve raising prices or cutting subsidies, is politically unpopular. Even in established democracies like the UK, tax rises to fix imbalances are deeply unpopular and often avoided until absolutely necessary. 

So, when it comes to Iraq's parliamentary elections, the economy tends not to drive policies or campaigns because the tough economic choices needed would be unpopular and politically risky. This short-termism extends well beyond Iraq—it's a global phenomenon. Iraq is heading toward a future where borrowing will increase, and major reforms are essential. But no politician wants to make those difficult decisions, especially not during election years. 

In Iraq, voter trust is shaped more by overall political performance over the past 20 years and historical grievances than by specific economic issues.

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