
Note on Scope: This policy paper focuses on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as the primary case study. Iraqi federal law, in particular Federal Noise Control Law No. 41 of 2015, is used throughout as the comparison benchmark to illustrate what is already in place at the federal level and where the KRG framework could apply improvement. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all analysis and recommendations are directed at KRG’s noise pollution policies.
Noise pollution is a known environmental health issue in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, but the governance framework is fragmented due to the lack of legal guidance and enforcement mechanisms. Repeated local studies in Sulaimani, Duhok, and Zakho have documented high levels of traffic and generator-related noise. The most specific legally enforceable limits on noise pollution, within the sources reviewed, are in the Iraqi Federal Noise Control Law No. 41 of 2015. The Kurdistan Region’s environmental law itself authorizes regulators to specify permissible noise levels, but a publicly accessible KRG regulation with numerical noise limits was absent, or non-existent, at the time of this review. The policy problem is therefore not lack of law but the combination of incomplete regulatory clarity, limited publicly visible monitoring and enforcement data, and weak integration of noise control into transportation, electricity, municipal planning, occupational health, and community compliance systems.
The KRG noise level standard compared to the Iraqi Federal Government law standard goes beyond the limited range that is allowed, especially in urban areas. Federal Law No. 41 sets outdoor national determination at4:
Iraq’s legal limits for noise measurement differ from WHO’s standards of noise exposure during day and night, yet they both have the same policy-approach application.5 On the other hand, in some areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, noise levels exceed the standard of Iraq’s legal limits and the WHO’s health-protective recommendation at the same time.
First, based on resources, the three main sources are busy roads and traffic, neighborhood diesel generators, and mixed use of commercial areas near public places. While Iraqi law explicitly recognizes the issues, the solutions prohibit distributing broadcasting media, using loudspeakers in public areas, and engaging in noisy activities at night. The Iraqi law tasks municipalities with reducing the noises through barriers, afforestation to absorb the sound, and parking management.6
Second, the implication is that noise pollution in Kurdistan, Iraq, is not solely a traffic problem, as other factors contribute significantly. In 2021, the Kurdistan Region Statistical Office (KRSO) had documented 3,108 private generators with 8,000 people working in that sector; they have also identified the environmental damage from the noise generators to the workers and the surrounding area as well.7 The official KRG statement in 2025 announced that private generators are considered the primary source of noise pollution in neighborhoods and linked their reduction to the Runaki Project to reduce and remove their operation.8 This underscores the need for integrating labor transitions, municipal enforcement, and related measures; they should all be planned together as one package rather than separate policy streams.
Iraq’s federal law gives clear numerical noise standards, while the KRG framework is broader and focused on building institutions and reinforcing rules but lacks publicly available numerical thresholds.9 The Iraqi Federal Ministry of Environment’s air quality page provides details about the application of the Noise Control law and preparation of studies and annual reports that include noise pollution measurement methods. On the KRG side, the Board of Environment Protection and Improvement offers testing services for pollution in the air, water, soil, and noise while monitoring sustainability across trade, housing, municipal services, farming, healthcare, and more.
| Law / Regulation | Noise Scope | Agencies | Enforcement | Penalties |
| Law No. 27 of 2009 | General environmental protection law; exact noise provisions should be verified in the full text. | Ministry of Environment and provincial councils. | Environmental oversight and implementation through the law’s institutional framework. | Exact noise specific penalties not confirmed from the available sources. |
| Law No. 41 of 2015 | Iraq’s noise control law; sets noise-control framework and limits. | Relevant ministries, employers, municipalities. | Planning and source control measures. | Exact penalty range should be checked in the law text. |
| Instructions No. 2 of 1993 | Instructions on permissible noise from devices and equipment | Ministry of Environment / relevant authorities | Not clearly verified from accessible sources. | Not clearly verified from accessible sources. |
| Law / Regulation | Noise scope | Agencies | Enforcement | Penalties |
| Law No. 8 of 2008 | Core KRG environmental law; likely covers noise within broader environmental protection, but the exact noise provisions should be checked in the text. | KRG environmental authorities. | Environmental controls and administrative measures, depending on the article text. | Exact noise-specific penalties should be verified directly from the law text. |
| Law No. 3 of 2010 | Establishes the Board | Board and related authorities | Institutional coordination and implementation support | Not verified in the source shown. |
| January 2025 PM directive | Likely relevant to generator/noise administration, but the exact content should be verified in the directive itself. | PM’s Office, office, Board, and municipalities. | Operational directives. | Not verified in the source shown. |
The following recommendations are based on an established comparison between the existing federal Iraqi laws and regulations in place, and the existing laws and regulations established by the KRG. The recommendations are based on the evaluation of the effectiveness of the federal laws, and their applicability and benefits to the KRI if adopted and implemented by the KRG.
The most important unresolved gaps are legal-operational rather than conceptual: what numeric limits KRG agencies currently enforce; whether a KRG noise standard exists in an unpublished or hard-to-find gazette; how many complaints, inspections, warnings, fines, and closures occur in practice; which agencies own sound meters and calibration capacity; how EIA follow-up is conducted after project approval; and how the phaseout of generator’s related to the Runaki Project are affecting neighborhood sound levels and livelihoods. These gaps are substantial enough that validation through interviews with Razan Omar Ali and Dr. Zhino Khalid is essential before making strong claims about enforcement performance.