Constitutional Authority Vs. Political Practice: The Marginalization of Kurdistan Parliament

Kurdistan Parliament’s constitutional powers and the political practice that has repeatedly sidelined them are the inevitable results of a governing system built on informal power-sharing rather than binding institutional rules. The absence of a regional constitution is also further evidence of an unresolved political choice, one that may well allow party bargains to continue overriding parliamentary authority and shaping government formation for decades to come.

The diminished role of the legislature is not incidental but historically embedded in the political process of the KRI.

Parliament and Executive Legitimacy 

Kurdistan Parliament is the only legislative body that is constitutionally mandated to legislate laws and vote on policies in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Beyond its lawmaking functions, Parliament is responsible for approving appointments to the executive branch after elections through a floor vote. This parliamentary vote is a fundamental source of democratic legitimacy because it provides formal constitutional authorization, ensures public accountability through elected representatives, and demonstrates that the executive enjoys the confidence of the legislature.¹ While political agreements may determine coalition formation, they do not substitute parliamentary approval, which is the constitutional mechanism that confers institutional legitimacy on a newly formed cabinet. However, the norm in the Kurdistan Region favors political agreements outside the chambers of Parliament,² which is the reason for delayed cabinet formations that require political agreements before parliamentary procedures. 

Despite the clear mandate and considerable powers of Kurdistan Parliament bestowed by the Iraqi Constitution as per Article 121, the executive branch, alongside powerful political parties, namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), continue to see the role and powers of Parliament as secondary. At times, parliamentary shutdowns proved more beneficial for the dominant political parties,³ whose political authority extends beyond the Parliament through extra-parliamentary negotiations and party structures. 

The unchecked powers of political parties pose a significant challenge to the institutional structure of the KRI, specifically Parliament. This is the reason that scholars of Kurdish politics describe the Kurdish political system as a “hybrid order” combining formal democratic institutions with highly personalized patronage structures.⁴ Another challenge to Parliament concerns the executive branch, namely the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). For over thirty years, Kurdistan Parliament still lacks the constitutional backing that empowers the legislature to set a timeline for cabinet formation and to hold the executive branch accountable on matters of regional governance.  

A parliamentary shutdown lasting more than twenty months undermines not only the constitutional role of the legislature but also the democratic mandate expressed through the popular vote.

The latest example of delayed cabinet formation is from 2024, when parliamentary elections took place on October 20, and persistent political disagreements have prevented cabinet formation ever since. However, the executive branch, the KRG, whose term has expired, continues to function and exercises its powers without perceiving a legitimacy gap to the present day. What is unprecedented is not the mechanism but its duration. Under the constitutional design of separation of powers, a political system is meant to lose function if the legislative branch disappears completely, yet the KRG has now governed without a seated Parliament confirming it for longer than any prior gap since 1992.

The legislative branch is naturally linked to the conception of popular sovereignty, which holds that the ultimate authority in a popular system rests with the people.⁵ A parliamentary shutdown lasting more than twenty months undermines not only the constitutional role of the legislature but also the democratic mandate expressed through the popular vote. Evaluating this legal gap, in which Kurdistan Parliament's chambers are bypassed and backdoor political agreements replace the floor vote, shows that the diminished role of the legislature is not incidental but historically embedded in the political process of the KRI, as explained in the following sections.   

Political Agreements and the Constitutional Vacuum 

A recurring failure has long weakened the institutional governing system in the KRI by relying on political agreements as a basis for cabinet formation. Political agreements, although an established practice in transitional political systems, are a dangerous road to government formation, as they may or may not result in political consensus and could easily result in political stalemate.⁶ One of the historically known political agreements in the Kurdistan Region is the PUK-KDP strategic power-sharing agreement of 1992, also called the 50-50 power split agreement. To date, the strategic agreement between the KDP and PUK continues to overshadow parliamentary votes. Although the agreement helped both the KDP and PUK overcome political disagreements in the past decades, today it fails to ease the path toward cabinet formation.   

A regionally adopted constitution would convert Parliament's existing authority from discretionary practice into binding obligation.

Despite political agreements that have weakened the Parliament's institutional authority and oversight functions, the KRI lacks a regional constitution that clearly defines the powers of the branches of the government. Although the Iraqi Constitution allows the KRI to adopt a regional constitution under Article 120, Kurdistan Parliament has not succeeded in drafting one, mostly due to a lack of political will and consensus.⁷ A regionally adopted constitution would convert Parliament's existing authority from discretionary practice into binding obligation. It would set a firm timeline for cabinet formation and establish the terms under which Parliament must intervene when the political process reaches an impasse.

Kurdistan Parliament's attempts to draft a constitution began in 2002.⁸ However, the draft was never put to a floor vote and remains unadopted. In 2021, KRI President Nechirvan Barzani requested the leadership of Parliament to take the necessary legal steps to prepare a draft constitution for the Kurdistan Region.⁹ Like previous efforts, parliamentary work on a draft constitution began without a defined timeline for completion. As a result, the draft did not reach a parliamentary vote, and disagreement expressed by members of Parliament categorically prevented its adoption. The absence of a regional constitution leaves key aspects of the Kurdistan Region's institutional framework insufficiently codified, as the KRI depends on rules, a series of laws, and norms to govern the Region. This constitutional gap also allows political agreements to play a greater role in shaping executive-legislative relations than would typically be expected under a comprehensive constitutional framework.   

To understand the historical role and powers of Kurdistan Parliament, it is necessary to examine its record from its inception in 1992 through 2026. This historical perspective illustrates how Parliament's role has evolved, or in some respects devolved, and what that means for the current mandate crisis and the Kurdistan Region's institutional outlook, particularly regarding cabinet formation and the recurrence of political deadlock regardless of which party secures the largest share of seats.  

A Historical View of Kurdistan Parliament (1992-2026) 

1992-2005: Creation and Dissolution of Parliament  

Kurdistan Parliament, previously the National Assembly, has had a turbulent time securing its constitutional place as a capable legislative body since its inception in 1992. This dilemma started during the civil war between 1994 and 1998,¹⁰ when the 100 members of Parliament protested inside Parliament chambers and firmly stood against the armed conflict and called for an end to the armed conflict, only for the KDP and PUK to ignore Parliament's mandate and opposition entirely, continue bearing arms, and administer their zones of influence separately.¹¹ In fact, the PUK controlled Erbil until August 1996, arguing that they occupied the city in December 1994 to protect Kurdistan Parliament from pending KDP assaults.¹² 

Consequently, the civil war effectively ended a unified Parliament,¹³ and each party formed their separate Parliaments, one in Erbil and one in Sulaimaniyah, respectively. The dual administration continued to operate until the PUK and KDP signed the Washington Accord in 1998,¹⁴ committing both parties to share political power and revenue, and reunify the separate administrations,¹⁵ as part of a broader diplomatic settlement.  

The Washington Accord obtained peace, but it did not obtain unity.

Charles Recknagel from Radio Free Europe

The result of the Washington Accord obtained peace,¹⁶ but it did not obtain unity. In practice, the Agreement further institutionalized division and reinforced the power-sharing agreement as a ”sharing of power between two separate administrations, not a unification into one government."¹⁷ Both parties continued to govern their respective zones of influence, the KDP from the Yellow Zone and the PUK from the Green Zone, for the eight years that followed. Each developed its own patronage networks, maintained separate Peshmerga and security forces, and exercised control over the financial and administrative resources within its territory.   

Following the liberation of Iraq in 2003 and a subsequent referendum vote on the Iraqi Constitution in 2005, Iraq formally recognized the jurisdiction of Kurdistan Parliament and deemed its powers, mandate, and laws constitutional.¹⁸ Yet the two administrations remained unmerged even after the formal recognition. It was not until 2006, which is eight years after Washington had promised the same outcome, that the PUK and KDP signed the strategic power-sharing agreement,¹⁹ aiming at the unification the first had failed to deliver.

2006-2017: Legislative Capacity and Institutional Crisis  

Kurdistan Parliament passed several landmark pieces of legislation concerning the Region's key public policy issues during its tenure from 2006-2013, including, inter alia, finances and fiscal policies, healthcare, education and training, policing and security, the environment, natural resources.²⁰ The KDP-PUK strategic power-sharing agreement was in full swing, and rotational cabinet formation had become the norm. The agreement, however, was challenged by the newly established Gorran Movement, a breakaway faction from the PUK led by Nawshirwan Mustafa, who later won landmark victories in subsequent elections and turned the movement into a viable opposition capable of challenging the KDP-PUK alliance. By 2009, Parliament's majority remained under KDP-PUK coalition control, with the coalition winning 55 seats and the Gorran Movement winning 25.²¹ The PUK, however, lost seats and voter base to Gorran in the 2013 elections, where the KDP secured 38 seats and Gorran 24 against the PUK's 18, displacing the PUK as the region's second-largest party.²² The Gorran Movement then struck a cabinet agreement with the KDP,²³ securing the speakership of Parliament and several ministerial posts. However, it did not take long before the KDP-Gorran agreement faced structural problems, especially over the extension of Masoud Barzani’s presidential term. This problem divided Kurdistan Parliament politically, which in itself encountered a range of unresolved political, financial, and security-related issues, eventually crippling its legislative capacity altogether.  

At best, Kurdistan Parliament's role in resolving the budget issue was inconsequential during this period.

Following the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011, the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged and triggered one of the most severe security crises the Kurdistan Region had faced since the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. By 2014, with ISIS rapidly expanding across Iraqi territory,²⁴ the Kurdistan Region was already selling oil independently,²⁵ which the Federal government in Baghdad argued was unconstitutional. Baghdad, already in a financial crisis, used this legal argument as a pretext to withhold federal salaries from the Kurdistan Region.²⁶ This would be the beginning of a protracted legal battle between Baghdad and Erbil over the KRI’s legitimate budget share as a federal region.   

At best, Kurdistan Parliament's role in resolving the budget issue was inconsequential during this period. Parliament condemned this move as “collective punishment,” threatening a political boycott and sending delegations to Baghdad to demand restoration of the Region's established budget share. However, the Iraqi Council of Representative passed the 2013 Budget Law despite the Kurdistan Region's boycott,²⁷ leaving the KRI without the funds to pay public-sector salaries. Baghdad also refused to meet its financial obligations to international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the Region, citing the alleged unconstitutionality of the oil contracts signed between the KRG and those companies.²⁸ 

A separate crisis followed roughly a year later, this time over the presidency rather than the budget. Barzani’s original term as president had ended in 2013, and Parliament had already extended it once, by two years, so that it ran until August 19, 2015.²⁹ When the KDP faction in Parliament sought a further extension that year, the Gorran movement, whose party held the speakership of Parliament, refused to bring it to a vote, arguing that Barzani had already served two terms and one extension.³⁰ The speaker, Yusuf Mohammed, was then banned from entering Erbil altogether,³¹ and Barzani remained in office without Parliament ever having passed a further extension.³² Parliament was suspended as a result and did not reconvene until 2017, when it held a floor vote authorizing the independence referendum at the request of President Masoud Barzani.

2017-2023: Referendum and the Aftermath   

By 2017, as Iraq announced the territorial defeat of ISIS, the Kurdistan Region was preparing for a landmark referendum vote to declare independence from Iraq. Although 92.7 percent of voters supported independence in the referendum,³³ the result was rejected by Iraq, regional neighbors, and the international community. The rejection culminated in Masoud Barzani's resignation as president and a general halt of diplomatic relations that the KRI enjoyed with foreign diplomatic representatives in the pre-referendum period. The referendum further triggered retaliatory military advances by Iraqi security forces, taking back over 40 percent of the disputed territories the Peshmerga had fought for and captured during the 2014–2017 war against ISIS.³⁴ It was in this context that Parliament resumed its sessions, officially rejecting the punitive measures the Iraqi government took against the Kurdistan Region in the aftermath of the referendum.³⁵ The prior suspension had already weakened Parliament's legitimacy, diminishing the constitutional authority it had accumulated since 2005.

As a result of the referendum, and given deteriorating relations with Baghdad, the KRI could not afford a federal legitimacy crisis on top of a dysfunctional legislature, so Parliament remained in session through the post-referendum period rather than suspending again. But the pattern of disregarding established rules as per the Iraqi Constitution reasserted itself immediately. One of Parliament's first actions after resuming was itself unconstitutional, a vote in October 2017 to extend its own four-year term by eight months, pushing the electoral timeline into 2018.³⁶ Even freshly reconvened and under pressure to demonstrate institutional legitimacy, Parliament's first move was to bend the rules governing its own mandate. The election eventually took place on September 30, 2018, with the KDP emerging as the victor with 45 seats, followed by the PUK with 21 seats, the Gorran movement with 12 seats, and the New Generation with 8 seats.³⁷   

By 2022, serious political disagreements between KDP and PUK in government reached a stalemate, particularly over alleged KDP intervention in PUK affairs.

Under a presidential decree, Masrur Barzani formed the ninth cabinet in 2019, with the 50-50 power-sharing agreement as pretext for a political deal between the KDP and PUK.³⁸ The agreement once again faced its own structural limitations when concerns about cabinet formation and equal partnership by PUK were raised. By 2022, serious political disagreements between KDP and PUK in government reached a stalemate, particularly over alleged KDP intervention in PUK affairs. Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani and ministers appointed at the behest of PUK staged a seven-month political boycott of KRG cabinet meetings, starting in October 2022 and concluding in May 2023. The boycott not only impacted the government's proceedings but also forced the delay of an election originally scheduled for November 18, 2022.  

Although the KDP‘s interference in PUK’s internal security apparatus remains the primary cause,³⁹ PUK had other external drivers behind the political boycott. PUK cited, for instance, economic grievances, protesting what it described as unfair budget allocations and the withholding of funds for Sulaymaniyah province by the Erbil-based KRG cabinet.⁴⁰ PUK officials further argued that since the government's foundational principle of ”consensus and partnership” had been violated, withholding participation from cabinet voting sessions was a legitimate defensive governance measure to protect the strategic balance of the Region. Whether it was a violation of executive mandate is unclear. What is clear is that the boycott left the underlying disputes over budget allocation and internal security unresolved, disputes that would resurface in the 2024 to 2026 mandate crisis under the same terms.

2023-2026: Judicial Override and the Collapse of Cabinet Formation 

Against this backdrop, the Kurdistan Region's 2022 election, similar to previous elections, was delayed, and Parliament extended its own mandate from 2022 to October 2023.⁴¹ The Iraqi Supreme Court ruled that extension unconstitutional, suspending Parliament's legislative sessions and terminating its fifth term in May 2023.⁴² The ruling significantly destabilized the KRI's political and institutional outlook, triggering a domino effect of legal and systemic restructuring that ultimately forced the October 2024 parliamentary elections. The Court also invalidated and thus canceled all decisions and laws passed after November 6, 2022. 

In a later ruling, on February 22, 2024, the Court stipulated that amendments to the KRI election law were unconstitutional. This decision nullified the existing 11 quota seats for minorities (Christians, Turkmen, and Armenians) and thus resulted in reducing the total number of the KRI Parliament’s seats to 100.⁴³ The Court further nullified the supervision of elections by the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral and Referendum Commission (KIHERC),⁴⁴ whose mandate had expired, and ruled that the regional commission no longer had the authority to administer elections. 

As a result, the KRI parliamentary election of October 20, 2024, became the only viable option to restore constitutional legitimacy. However, not only did it not restore such legitimacy, but the result of the election itself became a legitimacy crisis, as KDP with 39 seats, PUK with 23 seats, and New Generation with 15 seats began a lengthy battle over cabinet formation, which continues to the day of this writing.⁴⁵ Having won over 800,000 votes, the KDP stated that, due to the difference in seat numbers, it no longer saw the strategic power-sharing agreement as a fair deal to form the 10th cabinet.   

The PUK argued the opposite, stating that KDP had violated the agreement and deviated from the customary power-sharing arrangement between the two parties.⁴⁶ Although several rounds of negotiations have taken place between KDP and PUK, they have not led to a working framework for cabinet formation. Moreover, almost two years after the elections, both parties still accuse each other of conducting a ”policy of imposition”⁴⁷ over the Kurdistan Region's governance and disregarding the will of the Kurdistan Region's voters. 

The current deadlock is a logical continuation of Parliament's history, where informal bargain over an even split of power remains the instrument that decides cabinet formation.

As a result of the PUK-KDP deadlock, the PUK and the New Generation, under the premise of restoring the balance of power in the KRI, signed a bilateral agreement that strategically combined both parties' seat tallies, bringing them to 38 seats compared to KDP's 39, thus invoking a 50-50 framework to share posts within the Kurdistan Regional Government.⁴⁸ The move confirms how deeply the original 1992 power-sharing logic has penetrated the political arena. Even the new agreement between PUK-New Generation which is a third party now frames its claim to government in the KRI's founding logic of an even split in cabinet formation. Left unresolved, this trajectory risked pulling the KRI back toward the kind of administrative split last seen between 1996 and 2006, when the KDP and PUK governed separate zones rather than one region.

The continued mistrust, the abandonment of “consensus and partnership” as foundational governing principles, and the absence of a constitutional mandate establishing a timeline for cabinet formation have contributed to the political stalemate the KRI faces today. The current deadlock is a logical continuation of Parliament's history, where informal bargain over an even split of power remains the instrument that decides cabinet formation. What has changed is that Parliament, and the constitutional deadline it has never been bound to set, remains as absent from the process as it has been since 1992.

The 1998 Washington peace deal is closer to how two states enforce a ceasefire than how one government enforces a domestic power-sharing deal.

Brigitte Hugh, Utah State University

What Has Changed Since 1992 

The 1998 Washington Accord held peace for eight years without relying on Parliament, specifically because Parliament was not considered as the mechanism enforcing the peace agreement. The KDP and PUK kept separate governorates and separate peshmerga forces, giving each party the means to respond to violations of the agreement directly if the other broke the agreement.⁴⁹ This peace deal is closer to how two states enforce a ceasefire than how one government enforces a domestic power-sharing deal. It is also the reason cabinet formation has migrated outside Parliament's chambers since 1992 without collapsing the KRI altogether. What becomes clear is that the KDP-PUK bargain enforced itself, with or without a parliamentary vote behind it.  

This arrangement came out of the 1994-1998 civil war itself. The fighting showed both parties their real relative strength, information neither side had before the war, and revealed that Iran, Türkiye, and the PKK were acting as spoilers rather than reliable backers.⁵⁰ The Koya/Shaqlawa process that followed produced deliberately ambiguous language in the Washington Accord rather than a fixed executive structure, which let the parties keep negotiating the details for years afterward.⁵¹ The ambiguity in language and absence of fixed terms gave the agreement enough flexibility to survive the changes between 1998 and the 2006 Unification Agreement. 

Today, none of these conditions are present in 2024-2026 political process in the Kurdistan Region. Besides the absence of direct conflict or peace process, there are no separate zones currently functioning as a check on either side, since the KDP and PUK are contesting one cabinet rather than administering two. However, PUK-KDP communication channels are currently at their worst, and according to a senior PUK official, “no political relationship remained between the two parties, and that talks happen only when an outside power intervenes.”⁵² Every previous cabinet formation cycle, however slow, still took place inside some version of the informal KDP-PUK channel. This is the first cycle in which that channel does not appear to exist, or in which at least one of the two parties refuses to acknowledge that the old terms no longer apply.

The PUK-New Generation arrangement borrows its logic without that substance of power-sharing, given that the agreement is the result of a popular demand.

The PUK-New Generation agreement makes this changing political reality explicit. By combining seat tallies to invoke a 50-50 framework against the KDP, it revives the logic of the original bilateral arrangement while abandoning the bilateral structure itself. The old bilateral structure was power-sharing in substance or in its merits, a negotiated settlement between two parties of comparable strength, forged through years of conflict and diplomacy. The PUK-New Generation arrangement borrows its logic without that substance of power-sharing, given that the agreement is the result of a popular demand.

If a 50-50 split between two parties is what PUK-New Generation demands from KDP, the same logic should apply to the KDP-PUK relationship it claims to be replacing. The contradiction suggests the problem is not which agreement governs cabinet formation, but that no political party is willing to admit the power-sharing logic itself, which is built for two dominant actors, no longer describes the Kurdistan Region's political reality. None of the internal political disagreements that have lasted over 20 months are only a dispute over seat math. They show that the power-sharing logic which stood in for a regional constitution for three decades no longer describes who governs the Kurdistan Region. Once that logic stops holding, and the parties still refuse to replace it with a binding framework, the legal gap that used to be tolerable becomes the actual premise of the crisis. 

Cabinet Formations 

In the context of the KRI, informal mechanisms have driven the process of cabinet formation across nine cabinets. Cabinet formations have been the byproduct of a split, a division, a unification/rotation agreement, a joint ticket, or a majority coalition. To date, none of these mechanisms have been translated into a binding procedure. The absence of such a mechanism has never been more costly than now, because each prior mechanism was sustained only by whatever incentive made it useful at the time.⁵⁹ These examples include a mutual deadlock in 1992, a territorial survival pact after 1996, a shared push toward unification after 2003, and an electoral pact after 2009, each struck between the Kurdish leadership.⁶⁰ This pattern, shown in Table 1, reveals that, cabinet by cabinet, the 50-50 power-sharing framework and its successors have never been a binding rule, and once either side has a reason to abandon them, they can easily be dispensed with.  

This table explains the formation mechanism and resulting outcome of each of the Kurdistan Region's nine cabinets since 1992, showing that cabinet formation has never relied on a single, consistently applied, or constitutionally binding procedure. The table also lists the prime minister and governing party for each cabinet since 1992, illustrating the KDP-PUK duopoly's continuous hold on the premiership for at least the past three decades.⁶¹ 

Cabinets	Formed	PM (Party)	Formation Mechanism	Outcome
1st	July 1992	Fuad Masum (PUK)	Fifty Fifty split after 51-49 near-deadlock	Institutional paralysis
2nd	April 1993	Kosrat Rasul Ali (PUK)	Attempted revival of Fifty Fifty	Collapsed into civil war, 1994
3rd  (KDP)	1996	Nechirvan Barzani	Territorial division, Erbil	Parallel administration
3rd  (PUK)	1996	Kosrat Rasul Ali	Territorial division, Sulaymaniyah	Parallel administration
4th  (KDP)	December 1999	Nechirvan Barzani	Continued division	Ended by 2003 unification push
4th (PUK)	January 2001	Barham Salih, then Omer Fattah Hussain	Continued division	Ended by 2003 unification push
5th	May 2006	Nechirvan Barzani (KDP)	Unification (50-50) agreement	First joint cabinet since 1994
6th	October 2009	Barham Salih (PUK)	Joint ticket, rotation agreement	Rotation honored
7th	April 2012	Nechirvan Barzani (KDP)	Joint ticket, rotation agreement	Rotation honored
8th	June 2014	Nechirvan Barzani (KDP)	Broad coalition after joint ticket collapse	Survived ISIS, referendum, parliamentary lockout
9th	July 2019	Masrour Barzani (KDP)	KDP majority, PUK as deputy	Mandate later voided in 2023 by Iraqi Supreme Court

Institutional Outlook 

The Kurdistan Region's institutional outlook, when seen across five distinct periods, shows a pattern of informal mechanisms for cabinet formation, as demonstrated in Table 2. Across each period, an alternative has been offered to the same unresolved problem, namely the lack of institutionalism as a founding principle of the Kurdistan Region.⁶² This problem raises the question of how two parties of uneven and shifting strength govern a federal region without a binding rule forcing them to do so.

The KRI's institutional history lacks not only a binding constitution, but also a founding rule that would fix executive balance regardless of which party holds the advantage at any given moment.

The solution has varied according to the tools of power available to each party at the time. In the KRI's nascent democracy of 1992, the KDP and PUK resolved the power question through parity.⁶³ During the wartime separation that followed, they resolved it through partition, from 1994 until 2006.⁶⁴ When the strategic alliance took hold after 2006, the same rivalry was resolved through rotation,⁶⁵ two years of the head of government position, namely prime minister, for the PUK, and two years for the KDP. However, this was a one-time rotation, and the KDP has held the premiership ever since. During the crisis years that followed, necessity dictated the solution, starting with a coalition broad enough to survive ISIS and the aftermath of the referendum. As for the KDP-led centralization after 2018,⁶⁶ it has so far solved it through unilateral governance, one party holding the premiership while the legal framework meant to check that hold remains unresolved.

Particularly, the 2014-2019 period in Table 2 shows that the broad coalition between the political parties formed under external existential pressure rather than institutional design. This is mainly the factor that paved the way for the 2019-present period of KDP-led centralization, leading to unresolved legislative and mandate challenges rather than a negotiated executive balance. When read together with Table 1, this periodization shows that the KRI's institutional history lacks not only a binding constitution, but also a founding rule that would fix executive balance regardless of which party holds the advantage at any given moment.  

Cabinet Period	System Type	Primary Political Dynamic	Executive Balance
1992–1994	50-50 Coalition	Nascent Democracy	Absolute structural parity, prone to gridlock
1996–2006	Dual Administration	Wartime / Post-War Separation	Complete geographic split, executive bifurcation
2006–2013	Unified Strategic Alliance	Duopoly Consolidation	Rotational power sharing, institutional integration
2014–2019	Broad Multi-Party Coalition	Crisis Management	Fractured internal consensus, external existential threats
2019–Present	KDP-Led Coalition	Centralization and Judicial Friction	KDP-driven executive branch, severe legislative and mandate challenges

The difference between what Parliament is permitted to do and what the ruling parties permit it to do is the most consequential threat to the Kurdistan Region's democratic development.

The Future of Kurdistan Parliament  

The political situation that developed since 1992 has made one thing clear, which is that the powers of Parliament are undisputed as long as those powers do not conflict with party interests. Inter-party politics between the KDP and PUK has never changed what Parliament is legally permitted to do. What has changed and has become the norm is whether the two parties find it useful to let Parliament actually do anything. This very distinction, the difference between what Parliament is permitted to do and what the ruling parties permit it to do, is the most consequential threat to the Kurdistan Region's democratic development. Legitimate disagreement may exist over how power should be distributed between institutions. It cannot, however, extend to curbing Parliament's constitutional powers, or suspending its function, whenever the body ceases to serve the interests of the governing parties. Such conduct is neither democratically defensible nor legally justifiable. 

The analysis here reflects this problem in the current deadlock, where the dispute has already moved beyond Kurdistan Parliament or any other legitimate institution. Since 2005, the Iraqi federal presidency, a largely ceremonial post reserved by informal convention for a Kurdish figure, has been held by the PUK, whose cordial relations with Baghdad have secured the party's hold on it through successive federal governments. The KDP has recently challenged that hold, seeking the post for itself, contrary to the power-sharing norm set between the two parties. While the KDP's challenge to the post of presidency can be debated, the PUK's dependence on Baghdad for power brokering certainly broke from the practice of settling Kurdish disputes internally before engaging federal politics. This is one of the clearest signs of the KDP's refusal to honor the 50-50 agreement with the PUK, and the fundamental lack of partnership and strategic understanding between them.

As long as the conversion of political authority in the KRI remains dependent on informal bargains among two or three parties, the choice of whether to use Parliament will continue to rest with those parties rather than with the institution itself. 

Through this lens, the PUK's current disapproval of the political system in the KRI has led the PUK leadership to weigh suing the ninth cabinet before Iraq's Federal Supreme Court for continuing its caretaker role without any constitutional mandate. Using channels other than Parliament, such as federal litigation, alliances in Baghdad, and party-to-party talks brokered by political figures, erodes the powers and role of Parliament and indicates the democratic backsliding of the Region and its lack of recognition for the powers of the legislature. The most important point is that whatever viable political path the KRI leadership takes does not translate into new powers for Parliament. This is because, from a federal standpoint, the constitutional authority already exists to confirm a cabinet, to set its own rules of procedure, and to legislate a deadline for its own confirmation votes.  

What the KRI lacks is its own constitution to adopt and confirm these powers at the regional level. However, the political cost of using the powers of Parliament remains the key determinant of whether it exercises that role during this time of political crisis. Ultimately, what is required is a regional constitution that would translate that power from an informal option into a binding obligation. As long as the conversion of political authority in the KRI remains dependent on informal bargains among two or three parties, the choice of whether to use Parliament will continue to rest with those parties rather than with the institution itself. 

Conclusion 

Since 1992, across the nine consecutive cabinets and six parliamentary elections, cabinet formation mechanisms have never been codified into binding procedural law. Each working mechanism for cabinet formation functioned only for as long as it served the interests of the ruling political parties. Each mechanism, such as the PUK-KDP strategic power-sharing agreement, has been within either party's discretion to abandon once their interests lapsed. The present mandate crisis is a predictable consequence of the absence of any enforceable rule. However, resolving this legal gap does not require an expansion of parliamentary power because, from a federal standpoint, the constitutional authority already exists under Article 121. What remains absent is a codified regional constitution, which Article 120 permits but which Parliament has yet to draft and ratify, to convert the powers of the legislature from a discretionary practice into a binding legal obligation, one that would bind the KDP and PUK, and any other political party, regardless of which party holds the electoral advantage, and halt the constitutional drift this historical analysis has established since 1992.

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Acknowledgement: 

The author would like to thank all those who contributed insight and feedback during the course of this research, particularly Director of iNNOV8 Research Center, Imad Farhadi. The data and information relied upon in this paper are drawn primarily from open-source materials, with sources cited throughout. Any errors, omissions, or conclusions drawn remain the author's own. 

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