The US-Iran conflict brings Hormuz tension, fresh talks, and wider diplomatic strain. Credit: MSN Channel.Negotiating Disorder? The US-Iran Agreement's Coercive Diplomacy
The rescinded US-Iran memorandum and renewed fighting in the Strait of Hormuz are the inevitable results of an adversarial relationship built on a decades-old reliance on coercive diplomacy as the default mode of engagement. The collapse of the ceasefire is also further evidence of an absence of strategic choice, which may well normalize coercive leverage as the region's key instrument of power for decades to come.
Collapse of the US-Iran Ceasefire
On the sidelines of the NATO Ankara Summit, US President Donald Trump declared the ceasefire Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran effectively dead. The collapse of the ceasefire came after Iran targeted three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, with the US military response widening from limited retaliation into a new targeted campaign against Iran’s ability to disrupt maritime traffic. The military escalation, while currently contained, indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the text of the MoU, specifically clauses four and five concerning freedom of navigation and control of the Strait.
Although some analysis sees Washington as able to contemplate an array of strategies, such as a dramatic escalation, a conciliatory de-escalation, or a continuation of today's messy stalemate, in truth the US is faced with the absence of options. Instead, the ideological and political will sustaining the conflict between the US and Iran is a variable the text of the ceasefire agreement cannot capture. The persistent military confrontation and power struggle between the two nations incentivizes coercion, diplomatic ambiguity, and certainly the misinterpretation of each other's end goals.
Iran's grip on the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and the US's attempt to impose its terms on Iran, through citing international law principles, are both manifestations of coercion. One could even argue that the age of coercive diplomacy between both Iran and the US started nearly five decades ago, since before Operation Praying Mantis at sea, and it continues to the present day. The adversarial relationship defined by coercion has shaped decades through a persistent cycle of maximum economic pressure, military signalling, and fragile, mediated negotiations.
The MoU is the latest diplomatic text that attempts to direct coercive behavior toward a meaningful resolution. This is perhaps the reason why the MoU, built around strategies based mainly on coercion, has inherent limitations and thus is fragile, especially as both sides publicly contest the MoU's clause-specific meaning rather than establish a working mechanism for its implementation.
Neither the US nor Iran can meet their strategic goals through coercive means, nor can they arrive at a better alternative to the 14-point framework MoU.
The MoU and Maritime Conflict
In the context of the MoU clauses relating to maritime control, the framework agreement clearly uses pressure instead of the cooperation necessary to settle the maritime dispute. Upon signing the MoU on June 17, the US is to remove its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, Iran is obligated to remove technical and military obstacles in the Strait and use its best efforts to provide safe passage of commercial vessels at no charge.
In Washington, freedom of navigation through the Strait is interpreted as the most concrete commitment of the MoU. On the contrary, Tehran maintains that the rejection of Iranian route-control measures violates the political basis of the arrangement. With both sides blaming the other as the aggressor and proactively aiming for retaliation, it becomes clear how coercive diplomatic measures work in favor of each side.
The problem with coercion is twofold. First, the US’s decision regarding oil-license rescission from Iran and the latter's continued aggression in the Middle East set a dangerous precedent, especially in the absence of an implementation mechanism, followed by minor disagreements that instantly default to military standoffs. The second problem is that neither the US nor Iran can meet their strategic goals through coercive means, nor can they arrive at a better alternative to the 14-point framework MoU. The US cannot impose an American-led hegemonic order through military might, nor can Iran sustain an indefinite, open-ended confrontation, given the internal pressures Tehran is facing.
A new agreement is likely to collapse into disorder or, at best, be confined to a framework that manages the crisis while the conflicting parties contest control of the Strait and beyond.
Safe Passage but for Diplomacy
While the maritime clause remains the main point of friction, coercive logic drives the military tempo between the US and Iran rather than a concern for freedom of navigation. Despite popular opinion, the US is not the sole party that engages in coercion, as Iran's behavior is coercive as well, making both parties favor escalation over political compromise. The US’s military superiority, which is the key reason for its coercive diplomatic posture, is facing Iran’s top hardliners that prefer military action over negotiation attempts that may end in a binding agreement.
Iran perceives the Strait as its key leverage to coerce other Persian Gulf states and international commercial vessels passing through it. This coercive behavior is mutually feeding the conflict as much as the US’s does. This appetite for coercion, combined with a trust deficit, explains why negotiations fail and why the MoU is ineffective. Iran's trust issues and self-positioning as the aggrieved party are, to some extent, justified. Tehran's hardline policy takes its roots in the US's preemptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-day war, conducted while diplomatic negotiations were ongoing. It signalled a lack of good faith and a US preference for coercion over compromise—a lesson Iran has since adopted and now turns against the US.
Nonetheless, the danger of Iran controlling Hormuz cannot be overstated, as Marco Rubio stated during a meeting with Asian Nations. Rather, the danger lies in how conflicts are negotiated, especially when fragile frameworks let conflicting states get away with violating agreements that took months to prepare.
If a new framework does eventually emerge from the Omani, Pakistani, or proposed US-UK channels, it will inherit the same vagueness and contextual weakness as the MoU because neither the US nor Iran has renounced the use of coercive leverage as its key instrument of power. Therefore, with coercion looming over negotiations, a new agreement is likely to collapse into disorder or, at best, be confined to a framework that manages the crisis while the conflicting parties contest control of the Strait and beyond.
The opinions and interpretations presented in this commentary are solely the responsibility of the author and do not constitute the views of iNNOV8 Research Center.
Content Type:Commentaries
