Evolving Battlegrounds: The Legal Framework of Remote Warfare and the Case for Reforming International Law 

Issue at a Glance

For decades, international law and the rules of engagement have served as fundamental frameworks for safeguarding the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all nations. Under established norms, any lawful attack against a sovereign state must be an act of self-defense and meet the principles of immanence, necessity, and proportionality. Yet in today’s era of long-distance (remote) warfare defined by cross-border strikes and technological advancements, these rules and norms are consistently violated, eroding the very legal structures designed to prevent escalation and protect the sovereignty of all states equally. Modern warfighting capabilities across multi-domain operations—namely air, land, sea, space, and cyber, challenge international norms that fail to deter unrestrained remote aggression. With limited direct troop engagement, remote warfare provides tactical benefits to militaries, allowing them to pursue security objectives at a distance with fewer immediate costs. Due to strategic advantages, remote warfare has emerged as the most common form of military engagement of the 21^st century, yet it remains a concept that is poorly understood. 

Long-distance or remote warfare specifically refers to a mode of military engagement where states counter threats at a distance, minimizing their own troop deployments by relying heavily on local partners, proxy forces,¹ and technological tools such as drones, long-range missiles, autonomous weapons, and cyber operations.² The defining feature of remote warfare is the physical and operational “remoteness” of the intervening state from frontline combat,³ with local forces conducting the bulk of fighting. Its purpose is to achieve strategic objectives with a “light footprint,”⁴ reducing political and military costs while maintaining influence and control through indirect means. Remote warfare tactical advantages⁵ are considered highly effective in enhanced precision and situational awareness, operational flexibility and rapid response, deniability and covert action, and force multiplication via allies and partners. 

In the ongoing wars between Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza, and most recently Israel-Iran, all established rules of engagement have been repeatedly breached. When it comes to sovereignty, the very nature of remote warfare offers limited legal protections not only to the primary parties involved but also to states inadvertently drawn into conflict/war.

Current Wars as a Window into Remote Warfare

In the ongoing wars between Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza, and most recently Israel-Iran, all established rules of engagement have been repeatedly breached. When it comes to sovereignty, the very nature of remote warfare offers limited legal protections not only to the primary parties involved but also to states inadvertently drawn into conflict/war. In the context of the Israel-Iran war, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria exemplify neutral states caught in the crossfire, where international rules and norms have failed to preserve their sovereignty and internal stability. The crux of the issue concerns the rapid escalation of remote warfare marked by long-range missiles, autonomous drones, and stealth aircraft cross-border strikes that blatantly traverse these countries' airspace and territory.  

The key question the world grapples with currently is how to deal with the strategic and legal implications of today’s miniature nuclear war- which is metaphor for the destructive potential of precision long-range strikes that can cripple nuclear facilities and military command structures without deploying nuclear weapons.⁶ For instance, stemming from a 46-year-long conflict, the US and Israel’s preemptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, notably Natanz, Fordo, and Isfahan,⁷ blur the line between conventional and existential threats. This is mainly because the current legal framework designed for interstate wars struggles to address neither Iran’s cross-border missile attacks,⁸ nor Israel’s unilateral strikes,⁹ resulting in a war without formal declarations.  

Legally, using the Israel-Iran war as the basis for what constitutes remote warfare, the war tests the principles of proportionality and distinction,¹⁰ especially when strikes from both sides have hit civilian areas and critical infrastructure. With no end in sight, the ongoing tit-for-tat missile exchanges, targeted strikes, cyberattacks, and other standoff means between Iran and Israel establish a new norm of remote warfare that stretches the traditional concept of sovereignty¹¹ while placing increasing pressure on the international legal and security frameworks to adapt and evolve. Where the military capabilities of modern warfare far surpass those of the two World Wars,¹² rethinking international law and security frameworks becomes crucial to strategically place deterrence against the backdrop of modern warfighting capabilities empowered by autonomous weapons systems and rapid advances in artificial intelligence.

The Legal Status of Remote Warfare

The legal status of remote warfare under international law and security frameworks falls under the United Nations Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The primary issues with remote warfare center around preservation of state sovereignty, emerging technologies, and ensuring accountability and attribution for actions taken in complex and opaque operational environments. Significant legal gaps and breaches arise when applying an already outdated legal and security framework¹³ to remote warfare. Key applicable legal frameworks include Article 2 (4), Article 51 of the UN Charter, which are recognized as the fundamental provisions governing armed conflict and the use of force in international law. Article 2(4) stipulates,¹⁴ “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Article 51 provides an exception on the use of force¹⁵ under self-defense measures, stating, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.” Together, these articles balance the need to prevent aggression with the right of states to defend themselves- forming an internationally recognized legal basis for regulating use of force.   

In terms of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which governs the conduct of armed conflicts, a lawful strike/response must be an act of self-defense (including preventative self-defense claims)¹⁶ and fulfill the principles of distinction (between civilians and combatants), proportionality, and necessity.¹⁷ Remote strikes across borders, including all ranges of remote military actions, must avoid civilian harm and target only legitimate military objectives. Despite the peremptory norm (also known as jus cogens)¹⁸ that requires preemptive strikes to satisfy strict self-defense conditions codified in the UN Chater’s Article 2(4), the nature of remote warfare allows states and nonstate actors to circumvent the strict protections that jus cogens norms are meant to guarantee. In essence, remote warfare can easily exploit the gaps in these norms due to several factors inherent in its nature, including:¹⁹ 

• Attribution and accountability challenges rise when strikes are carried out by drones, missiles, or cyber operations, sometimes involving autonomous weapons systems and covert means. The legal gray zone here concerns attributing responsibility to a state or actor, which complicates enforcement mechanisms for jus cogens norms and accountability for violations.
• Cross-border operations without the consent of the targeted state²⁰ mean limited immediate risks for the aggressor and increase its ability to deny accountability. Since states are bound by jus cogens, the primary challenge in the context of remote warfare is not its legality of conduct but the jus cogens‘ practical enforcement and the responsibility of these legal obligations by states.
• One of the most underrated characteristics of remote warfare relates to its nature of rapid and repeated engagements,²¹ fueling a cycle of escalation that outpaces diplomatic or legal responses and blurring the line between lawful self-defense and aggression.
• Autonomous weapons, extended-range missiles and drones, and non-kinetic cyber operations have become defining tools in remote warfare where existing international legal frameworks struggle to adapt or effectively regulate these technologies. In terms of non-kinetic cyber operations, problems with attribution and accountability are magnified,²² including when it supports kinetic strikes and covert sabotage of air defenses.

In this sense, the core governance issue lies in remote warfare’s defining features that can easily exploit weaknesses in static legal frameworks designed specifically for conventional conflict. Perhaps the most significant legal challenge bypassing foundational rules and their applications to remote warfare relates to the regulatory void in emerging technologies. Both autonomous weapons²³ and cyber operations²⁴ fall into a legal gray zone. Under IHL’s accountability structures, the inherent lack of human control in the use of autonomous weapons creates reasonable doubt in assigning responsibility for unlawful attacks. In the latter case, the non-kinetic nature of cyber operations²⁵ strains existing legal structures to assign “armed attack” thresholds and attribution standards to cyberattacks.  

Simply put, international law not only has failed to regulate these emerging tools; it inadvertently enables violations of distinction and proportionality principles to occur without effective means of redress. There is also profound enforcement paralysis in remote warfare;²⁶ even when violations occur and are identified, political and institutional barriers could potentially block enforcement. For instance, the UN Security Council’s veto dynamic²⁷ prevents consensus on cross-border strikes, in addition to states exploiting attribution ambiguities to avoid responsibility. Thus, this core governance dilemma allows remote warfare to continue to operate at the edges of legality, where IHL principles and established norms, specifically jus cogens, are binding in theory but unenforceable in practice.

Stemming from the tangentiality of remote warfare, limited legal protections are offered to states assuming a “neutral” status. 

The non liquet Legal Standing of Third-Party and Neutral States

Another complexity of remote conflict is that it easily spills over borders, drawing neutrals into conflict, creating a non liquet status for third-party states. The non liquet status concerns the legal rights and responsibilities of third-party states, which implies a legal gap where existing international law offers no clear framework or mechanism for adjudicating the involvement of states that are neither direct combatants nor mere bystanders or are affected by remote military operations.²⁸ The absence of explicit legal norms for third-party states' actions results in indirect involvement, such as through proxies or intelligence sharing for remote strikes. In this legal void, third-party states operate in a legal gray zone²⁹ where they can achieve military objectives with plausible deniability. Such a lacuna not only weakens foundational principles of IHL but also makes it unclear who is accountable for the damage and harm caused by remote strikes and other associated military operations. Addressing this legal ambiguity is essential for actors and states that are tangentially involved or affected by remote military actions.  

Stemming from the tangentiality of remote warfare, limited legal protections are offered to states assuming a “neutral” status. The traditional law of neutrality under international law requires the neutral state’s territorial sovereignty to be respected during conflicts and prevents their territories, including airspace, from being bases of war. Under this customary international law, neutral states whose territories are infringed upon are allowed to prevent or terminate such violations within their capacity, thereby upholding their neutral status.³⁰ Largely dormant under the UN Charter, the law of neutrality³¹ provides little clarity on how to handle gray cases. For instance, the Israel-Iran war has dragged Jordan and Iraq,³² into the war despite their official neutral status. Israeli strikes and Iranian projectiles deep into Iraqi and Jordanian airspace have left these states with limited legal solutions to protect their airspace from further incursions.³³ However, Iranian proxies operating within Iraq’s territory³⁴ add a layer of complexity to the neutrality status Iraq vehemently assumes. In any case, Israel’s use of Iraqi and Jordanian airspace to launch attacks deep into Iranian territory is a breach of these two states’ sovereignty. It also highlights how remote strikes blur traditional legal boundaries where neutral states grapple with limited legal options in enforcing their neutrality and sovereignty. Therefore, the neutrality principle, while upheld in spirit, fails to assist a neutral state to prevent attacks emanating from its soil, or passing through its territory, such as airspace violations as a result of remote warfare operations.

Remaking international law in the context of remote warfare should not be understood in changing norms and principles. Governing remote warfare does not fail because current norms are inapplicable. It fails because the existing structural enforcement mechanisms cannot overcome operational deniability and technological asymmetry of remote warfare.

Policy Options: Remaking International Law

Adapting international law to remote warfare should start with reforming legal frameworks and security structures designed for conventional conflict/warfare. Creating such a governance regime must address remote warfare’s defining features, specifically speed, ambiguity, and technological remove- the physical and operational distance created by advanced technologies- such as drones, cyber capabilities, and precision-guided munitions- that enable military actors to conduct warfare remotely, minimizing direct exposure to combat and reducing the risk to personnel.³⁵ More importantly, remaking international law in the context of remote warfare should not be understood in changing norms and principles. Governing remote warfare does not fail because current norms are inapplicable. It fails because the existing structural enforcement mechanisms cannot overcome operational deniability and technological asymmetry of remote warfare.³⁶ Grounded in international practice and emerging legal scholarship, closing the overall legal gap of remote warfare requires several key adaptations in international law³⁷ including, inter alia, the following:³⁸

On the International Level: 

1. Clarify Self-Defense Rules (Including Preemptive Strikes)
   • Refine the concept of "armed attack" and establish clear thresholds for lawful preemptive self-defense in scenarios involving nuclear threats, cyberattacks, and drone swarms, aligning with Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary law.
   • Require states invoking self-defense to publicly notify the Security Council, ensuring transparency and compliance.
2. Neutral and Third-Party State Protection Governance
   • Adopt a UN Security Council or General Assembly resolution affirming that any remote attack transiting neutral airspace or territory violates sovereignty.
   • Mandate that states hosting foreign drones or proxies must prevent unauthorized operations, supported by legal reinforcement through regional agreements (e.g., US–Iraq framework).
3. Attribution and Shared Responsibility Mechanisms
   • Establish joint cyber-forensic and missile/drone strike attribution centers that pool technical, legal, and intelligence resources to attribute responsibility for drones, missiles, cyberattacks, and autonomous systems.
   • Create an international “Drone, Missile & Cyber Fact-Finding Mission,” modeled on the Chemical Weapons Convention’s Fact-Finding Commission, to investigate multi-domain incidents and support collective accountability for jus cogens violations.

On State Level:

1. International Humanitarian Law Adaptation for Autonomous and Cyber Systems
   • Negotiate a Geneva Convention protocol defining the lawful use of autonomous and cyber weapons, requiring “meaningful human control.”
   • Strengthen IHL by integrating outcomes from Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) discussions to close accountability gaps.
2. Strengthen Defensive Capabilities Against Remote Military Operations
   • Invest in missile defense, counter-drone, and cyber-hardening measures for national and allied infrastructure.
   • Enhance cross-border intelligence cooperation and develop contingency plans to protect neutral states from unintended spillover.

Key Takeaways 

While these policy areas can function as an effective guide for governing remote warfare, no single reform alone can solve the many legal gray cases remote warfare poses to international legal frameworks. However, a unified governance regime for remote warfare can adapt the legal framework to 21st-century warfare. More importantly, updating the rules of the road is paramount in preserving sovereignty and stability as remote warfare continues to strain and breach basic international norms. Central to these reforms are clarity in self-defense claims, respect for neutral territory, and closing the accountability gap for new weapons. A more active role of the international community could also deter unrestrained remote aggression and regulate technological advances to ensure safeguarding the fundamental principles of sovereignty embedded in the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law principles.

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